INTRODUCTION
Rising audit market concentration has attracted the interest of regulators, market participants and academics for many years, especially since the audit firm megamergers of the 1980s and 1990s which reduced the global Big 8 to the Big 5. During that period, there was a general concern (based on the predictions of classical microeconomic theory) that excessive concentration would reduce competition, leading to an increase in the price of the services provided by the auditor (Financial Times, 1997) . Paradoxically, there was also concern, based on observed market behaviour, regarding excessive competition and low-balling (e.g. CAJEC, 1992) . From an industrial economics viewpoint, high seller concentration can both harm consumers and also benefit them through, for example, economies of scale and scope. Although concerns about the so-called 'mega-mergers' on competition were raised, in general the regulatory conclusion was that the mergers would be unlikely to substantially lessen competition (Goddard, 1998; Thavapalan et al., 2002) .
A further major shock to the system of financial reporting and auditing arose when the US energy giant, Enron, failed in 2001. This event, along with other financial scandals in the US, led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which instituted reforms designed to restore confidence in corporate governance. Given the global nature of capital markets and further scandals in Europe (e.g. Parmalat), there have been moves to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley style reforms throughout Europe and elsewhere (Oxley, 2007; Quick et al., 2007) . In June 2002, Andersen, one of the top five audit firms in the world, was convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding documents related to Enron.
1 As a result, the firm lost its auditing license in the US.
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In August 2002, the firm ceased business and, in the UK, was acquired by Deloitte & Touche, reducing the number of big accounting firms from five to four. In the US, the Andersen business was dissolved and former Andersen clients switched to other, mainly Big 4, audit firms. This event sparked further intense debate, which is ongoing, about competition and audit quality in the audit market (e.g., EC, 2002;  However, as the EC and Beattie et al. (2003) studies were based on pro-forma figures, there is no published study that documents the actual impact of Andersen's dissolution in the UK. Further, since these studies cover only a very short period of time, the extent of change in concentration in the UK listed company audit market in recent years is not yet fully documented. This is especially true for the period following the Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merger in 1998. To our knowledge, the only UK study that offers a detailed investigation of audit market concentration among the entire population of listed companies during the 2000s is Beattie et al. (2003) . Previously, studies undertaken by Briston and Kedslie (1985) , Turley (1987, 1989) , Beattie and Fearnley (1994) , Peel (1997) , 5 and Pong (1999) jointly cover the period from 1972 to 1995. 6 The study by Pong and Burnett (2006) commissioned or produced by regulators (Oxera, 2006; POB, 2006 POB, , 2007 FRC, 2007b) The present study seeks to provide answers to the following specific questions with respect to the UK domestic listed company audit market during the crucial period of structural change 1998-2003:
General issues
• What was the level of audit market concentration following the PricewaterhouseCoopers' merger and Andersen's demise (i.e., 1998 to 2003) and has it changed significantly? • Are the larger mid-tier firms in a position to compete in the listed company market?
• Have audit fee rates changed significantly during the period?
• What is the relative importance of joiners, leavers and switchers in explaining the overall change in audit market concentration?
Andersen-related issues
• How did the Andersen demise affect market concentration?
• Following Andersen's demise, who now dominates the market at industry level? • Who audits former Andersen clients and did their audit and/or non-audit services (NAS) fees change significantly?
The specific contributions of the paper are fourfold. First, it provides a discussion of both the traditional and contemporary theory of industrial economics and its limitations in relation to making predictions about real markets (and the audit market in particular.) Second, it presents a descriptive analysis of the structure of the entire population of the listed company market (where existing studies cover only restricted samples) and at a detailed level (industry sector and individual firm) for a crucial period of structural change. Third, it offers insights into the complex dynamics underlying observed changes in market structure by undertaking a decomposition analysis. Fourth, it contributes to the growing, and conflicting, Andersen-related literature by (i) analysing the impact of this event in the UK, where no study has yet been published; (ii) documenting the impact on market structure; (iii) analysing the fee impact of the Andersen dissolution, controlling for company size; and (iv) evaluating the possible impact of NAS fee cross-subsidisation on audit fees.
Due to the global nature of many large companies, the capital markets and the audit firm networks, the characteristics of the UK listed company audit market are shared with many other markets worldwide (FRC, 2006a: 8) . Thus, the findings and conclusions from the present study have potential relevance in the global setting.
Notwithstanding this, however, national markets do have specific characteristics and features. For example, the manner of the Andersen dissolution varied across countries -in the UK most clients transferred to Deloitte & Touche, in Australia most transferred to Ernst and Young and in the US the spread was fairly wide.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the economic theory on market structure and behaviour, before considering the unique features of the audit market setting and discussing the factors that lead to changes in market concentration. This literature section goes on to review prior empirical studies of audit market concentration, the consequences of market concentration and the impact of Andersen's demise on audit pricing. Section 3 outlines the methods used to measure audit market concentration, data sources and data collection methods. Section 4 presents the results and discussion. Finally, Section 5 concludes the study.
RELATED LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Industrial economics: traditional and contemporary theory
From the 1940s until the 1970s, the study of industrial organisation has centred on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm. This theory posits that there is a direct link from structure, to conduct, to performance. The implication is that the more concentrated an industry, the more market power 7 the organisation exercises and thus the larger the deviation from competitive pricing. This view resulted in aggressive antitrust policy in the US and Europe (Pepall et al., 2008) .
Over time, the strict one-way causality assumed by the SCP view was called into question. It was realised that increased concentration, when combined with cost efficiencies, does not necessarily lead to higher prices. In equilibrium, both concentration and performance are endogenously determined by underlying cost and demand parameters (Beattie et al., 2003) . Thus, more efficient firms should grow faster than less efficient firms resulting in a more concentrated industry structure.
This offers a more benign explanation of the observation that larger market shares go hand in hand with greater profitability.
In the 1970s, researchers at the Chicago School began to consider the importance of strategic interactions among interdependent firms in conditions of imperfect competition and the ability of firms to enter the market. The focus shifted from the study of market structure (S) and performance (P) to the study of conduct (C) (i.e., strategic behaviour). It was gradually realised that the decisions made by firms regarding pricing, nature of product/service, expansion and investment feed back to affect structure. Strategic interaction was modelled using (non-cooperative) game theory, giving rise to the 'new industrial organisation' theory of the 1980s and which continues to the present. The Cournot, Bertrand and Stackelberg models (each with its different assumptions) have become central to the study of oligopoly (Pepall et al., 2008) .
Industrial economists have suggested that a tight oligopoly prevails where the market share of the top four firms exceeds 60%, with a loose oligopoly for below 40% market share (Shepherd, 1997) . A tight oligopoly has fewer rivals, higher concentration, stable market shares and medium to high barriers to entry, whereas a loose oligopoly has more rivals, lower concentration, unstable market shares and low barriers to entry.
Collusion is considered more likely in tight oligopolies.
The PricewaterhouseCoopers merger and the Andersen demise represent de jure and de facto horizontal mergers, respectively. Such mergers offer an obvious threat to
competition. Yet it is difficult to construct an economic model in which there are significant gains to the merged company due to cost efficiencies -this is the 'merger paradox'. As a consequence of these theoretical ambiguities, competition regulation must also rely on empirical analysis to predict ex ante and observe ex post the effects of changes in market structure (Pepall et al., 2008, ch. 16 ). Yardley et al. (1992) and Beattie and Fearnley (1994) review industrial organisational theory and its relation to the audit market. The unique characteristics of the audit market (e.g. statutory requirement for audit and regulated activity) mean that the determinants and consequences of concentration are especially difficult to assess using theoretical analysis and, therefore, must be investigated empirically. The demand for audit is inelastic (as audit is a statutory requirement for listed companies)
The audit market setting
and there is the possibility of cross-subsidisation of audit fees arising from the provision of non-audit services (NAS). Key general influences on the audit market are economic, political and regulatory in nature: stage in the economic cycle, shocks caused by financial scandals such as Enron and regulatory intervention into the audit market (e.g. corporate governance codes; US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). The demand from company managers, company board and shareholders for low cost versus high quality audits varies over time. The actual level of concentration and competition (both price and quality) is the result of complex interactions between these general influences, mediated by specific company and audit firm factors.
Sources of change in market concentration
There are three principal sources of change in concentration: change in the set of consumers; change in the set of providers; and realignments (switches). Change in the set of consumers results from new companies entering or exiting the market through initial public offerings, insolvencies and mergers (Beattie et al., 2003) .
Further, in the case of the market for public listed companies, delisting, re-admission and temporary suspension will also affect the measured concentration level in that particular market segment.
Changes in the set of suppliers can occur as a result of audit firm merger or demise.
In the case of the market for audit services, merger is generally stated as the main reason for increased concentration. Mergers and acquisitions have been used as a means for audit firms to expand their business to achieve greater economies of scale and also industry-specific expertise (GAO, 2003) . Gramling and Stone (2001) note that audit industry expertise may potentially improve firm efficiency through economies of scale resulting from concentrating resources and technology investment in specific industries. However, industry expertise can also create barriers to entry for competitors, especially for smaller firms. Gramling and Stone (2001) also note that professional standards and emergent risk-based audit technologies demand that audit firms integrate industry expertise into their audit approaches and, as such, auditor specialisation has become both a minimum requirement and a barrier to entry in the audit service market.
Industry specialisation, however, is not the only barrier that smaller firms are facing.
According to GAO (2003) , high capital requirements, lack of recommendation by capital market participants and high litigation risk and insurance costs are also important, particularly in the case of the audit market for public listed companies.
8,9
The demise of large audit firms, though very rare, is also popularly thought to increase market concentration. Interestingly, however, neither Comunale and Sexton (2003) nor Duxbury et al. (2007) Voluntary realignments are said to occur where companies initiate the auditor change.
In the UK and many other countries, companies are free to change and to select a new auditor, with shareholders' approval. The main reasons for voluntary realignment in the UK during the 1990s have been shown to be high audit fee, dissatisfaction with the auditor's ability to detect problems, changes in company's top management, the need for group auditor rationalisation, the perceived need for a Big 6 auditor, and a company's merger or takeover (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998) . If there is an underlying preference for the leading suppliers (currently the Big 4 firms), then these realignments, provided that other factors remain equal, will result in rising concentration (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Beattie et al., 2003) . Audit firm resignations are uncommon and signal forced change for the client company.
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However, the political climate may cause some audit firms to reassess the risk profile of their client portfolio and they may not seek reappointment in the case of 'risky'
clients.
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The informed interpretation of observed changes in market concentration requires an understanding of the nature and relative importance of these various underlying sources of change.
Empirical studies of concentration in the UK listed company audit market
The number of audit firms active in the market has been used as an indicator of market structure. The two concentration measures reported in prior studies are the kfirm concentration ratio (CR) and, less commonly, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HI). These measures are based on either number of audits or audit fees. Table 1 summarises the findings from 15 prior academic and professional studies on concentration in the UK market, covering the 35 year period 1972-2007. By organising the findings according to time and measure, the trend over time is revealed.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Column 3 of Table 1 show that great care must be taken when comparing the findings from different studies and what is included in the definition of listed companies can vary greatly. In several studies Turley, 1987, 1989; McMeeking 2007) , only the largest companies are included, while in another (Oxera, 2006) there is a bias towards the largest companies. Some studies include only a sample of companies while others exclude Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies, which are generally smaller than main market companies. The number of companies on the main market has been declining steadily for 10 years, while the number of AIM companies has been rising at a much faster rate. For this reason, it is increasingly important that studies include this sector of the listed company market to avoid the upward distortion of the large-company focus on concentration measures based only on the main market. Finally, two studies (Pong, 1999; Pong and Burnett, 2006 ) exclude investment trusts, although this will have no systematic effect provided that they have a similar size distribution to the other companies included in the sample. 12 These choices greatly affect the number of companies included in the 'UK listed' sample (see column 4 of Table 1 ).
Notwithstanding these sampling differences, the general trend over time is one of increasing concentration. In discussing this trend, results from Turley (1987, 1989) In a recent published study of the entire population of UK listed companies, Beattie et al. (2003) analysed the effect of Andersen's demise on audit market concentration (on a pro forma basis) and estimated that the top four firms were likely to increase their market share from about 67% to 73% and from about 90% to 96% on the basis of number of audits and audit fees, respectively. The study identified that the levels of concentration were significantly higher in premier market segments (i.e. FTSE 100
and 250) and in certain industry sectors. Based on actual data drawn from Public Accounting Reports, Feldman (2006) reports that Andersen's exit from the market increased concentration by the top four firms from 85% to 95%.
High and rising levels of audit market concentration have been reported in numerous academic studies undertaken in non-UK countries (e.g., in the US: Wolk et al., 2001 and GAO, 2003; in Australia: Thavapalan et al., 2002; in Germany: Quick and Wolz, 1999 ; in international markets: Choi and Zeghal, 1999; Narasimhan and Chung, 1998;  in the EU: Ballas, 2005 
Evidence on the consequences of concentration
Evidence from audit market concentration studies suggests that increased market concentration does not necessarily decrease competition. For instance, while the merger between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand increased the Big 5 market share at the aggregate market level, Thavapalan et al. (2002) report that, for a number of industry sectors in Australia, a more equitable spread of audit clients between the Big 5 firms was achieved. The GAO (2003) study also found no empirical evidence to support the contention that competition in the audit service market has been impaired, similar to the earlier studies such as Dopuch and Simunic (1980) and Danos and Eichenseher (1986) .
Consequences of Andersen's demise
Many studies have investigated the impact of Andersen's demise on issues other than concentration, in particular, auditor selection decisions and audit pricing. In an analytical paper, Schloetzer (2006) Outside the US, evidence is limited. Hamilton et al. (2008) , using Australian data, conclude that overall the market remained competitive following Andersen's breakup. However, they find higher premiums generally for Big 4 audits post-Andersen and the audit fee data reported for former Andersen clients show an above-inflation rise in aggregate audit fees of 9.8% (derived from Researchers have noted that standard, single period cross-sectional audit fee models do not address 'the dynamics of changes in audit fees' and that call for further research on this important issue (Clatworthy and Peel, 2007, p.198) . The Andersen failure offers a quasi-experimental setting in which the factors impacting changes in audit fees can be observed. 
Hypotheses
Traditional industrial economics theory predicts that mergers will increase market concentration and (in certain circumstances) increase profits. Translating these predictions into the audit setting is, however, problematic. As audit firm costs are unobservable, audit fees (revenues rather than profits) must generally be used to proxy for profits. Further, the market for audit services and the market for NAS are linked due to knowledge spillovers (Stein, 2006) , which introduces an additional strategic interaction variable. The scandal associated with Andersen's demise gave rise to a unique merger situation in which the demand for monitoring, which is costly, increased. However, to set against this, the selection of an audit firm requiring a new audit team incurs costly switching costs.
Given the audit firm's demise, companies were forced to change from Andersen acting as both auditor and as the firm providing the consultancy reflected in the NAS reported in the financial statements. They could choose whether to use the newly appointed auditor (resulting in reported NAS) or a different firm to provide NAS (and zero reported NAS). Given the political pressure to avoid potential conflict of interests in joint provision, the reported NAS might be expected to fall to reduce the perceived (or real) threat to auditor independence. Alternatively, knowledge spillovers and/or the new auditor's desire for increased fees and profit via crosssubsidisation of the audit fee might lead to increased reported NAS.
Based on the above discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature, the following specific hypotheses in relation to the Andersen break-up are tested;
following Andersen's demise:
H1: Audit fees generally increased.
H2: Market concentration increased.
H3: Ex-Andersen clients' audit fees increased.
H4: Big 4 firms (but not Deloitte & Touche, the audit firm that took over Andersen in the UK) benefited from audit fee premiums from ex-Andersen clients.
H5a: Reported NAS fees decreased following Andersen's demise (consistent with response to concerns over independence threats).
H5b: Reported NAS fees increased following Andersen's demise (consistent with knowledge spillovers and/or audit fee cross-subsidisation).
METHODS
The audit market examined in the present study concerns the auditors of all domestic UK companies listed on both the main and AIM markets of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period 1998 through 2003. Information about companies, their auditors and industry classification was extracted from the Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook (SEYB). 16 Accounting data (sales, total assets and audit fees)
were mainly sourced from Datastream with recourse to FAME and annual reports to fill in missing data. These data requirements reduced the sample size and led to the exclusion of investment trust companies, in particular. For companies identified as having changed auditors, audit firm details were cross-checked against annual reports or, in the few situations where these were not available, against data in FAME.
Changes in the audit market can be caused by the entry and exit of companies to and The second measure, the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HI) index, is a market-wide concentration measure that is sensitive to the number of active firms and to the variance in activity levels across firms. It has been used in the US to aid in the interpretation of concentration data (GAO, 2003) and is calculated as follows: active in the market the index equals 100, while the index approaches 0 when there are numerous firms of equal size. The HI has two advantages over concentration ratios. First, it is based on all market participants rather than just the k largest firms (Pong, 1999) . Second, it gives a better indication of the relative market control of the largest firms (as a result of the squared measure). For example, a 4-firm concentration ratio of 80% could be made up of one firm with 60% and three sharing the 20%, or perhaps four firms having 20%. The former would result in a higher HI measure, reflecting the concentration in the largest firm (Wootton et al., 1994) .
The Gini coefficient is closely linked to the Lorenz curve and measures something subtly different to CR and HI, namely the inequality between market participants. This can be of specific benefit when comparing the market shares within the Big5/4 group, for example. Its value lies between 0 and 100, where 0 means perfect equality and 100 means perfect inequality (i.e., one firm has all the income with everyone else earning nothing). The higher the coefficient, the greater the inequality of income in the market. An advantage of the Gini coefficient is that it is not easily affected or disturbed by changes in the size of a population. If the data is ordered by increasing size of market share, it is calculated as follows: (i.e., the mean market share).
All three measures provide an indication of market concentration for the aggregate audit market. To obtain more information about the dominance of individual participating firms, the calculation of individual audit firms' market share is required.
Four different measures of market share have been used to date. The number of audits is perhaps the most commonly used measure; it is intuitive, facilitates reconciliation with changes in the population of consumers and auditor switches and its calculation requires knowledge only of the identity of the auditor. However, the existence of an audit is a poor measure of activity level and so, in settings where audit fees are disclosed, audit fees are used as the measure of choice. Concentration measures based on number of audits, while highly correlated with measures based on audit fees, are known to be systematically lower due to the 'size effect', whereby large companies tend to employ large audit firms. In settings where audit fees are not disclosed, inferior measures of total assets or total sales are used to proxy activity level; in the present study, the preferred measure of audit fees is used. (Briston and Kedslie, 1985) . 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive statistics
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Auditee company size, with respect to total assets, ranged from just £3,000 to a high of £455 billion. In term of sales, some companies in each year reported £0 sales and the highest sales reported was £61 billion in 2002. The mean values for both total assets and sales increased by considerably more than inflation over the period (see RPI change in Table 2 , row 4). As mean values can be heavily influenced by outliers, the median is also shown. Over the six year period, the median values of total assets and sales fell by 10% and 20%, respectively. The rise in mean and fall in median reflect an increase in the numbers of both large and very small companies since 1998.
A comparison of the size distributions (based on total assets) in 1998 and 2003 shows that the proportion of companies with assets above £500 million increased from 16% to 20%, and the proportion below £30 million from 37% to 42%.
Audit fees ranged between £1,000 and £18 million. Over the six year period, mean (median) audit fees rose by 35% (10%) compared with general price inflation of 11%.
The increase in the mean ahead of inflation may reflect high increases in audit fees for large companies and/or the higher proportion of large companies in the population already identified. Therefore, to explore whether the increase in audit fees merely reflects an increase in client size, the rate of audit fees per unit of size is reported. The last two panels in Table 2 show that, in terms of aggregate audit fee charged related to total assets, the rate fell from 1998 to a low in 2001 then picked up in 2002; the trend based on sales was broadly similar. The mean value of individual fee rates suggests that there was a sizeable increase in audit fee rate (scaled by total assets) in 2001 and 2002 . 18 The corresponding increase in median audit fee rate is much more moderate.
By contrast, both mean and median audit fee rates based on sales started to increase earlier (in 2000) and showed a decrease by 2003.
One plausible explanation for the mid-period increase is the regulatory and public response to Andersen's misconduct. Following the downfall of Andersen and the subsequent public concern about audit quality, companies had a smaller number of large auditors to choose from, so the remaining audit firms had greater market power. Table 3 and Figure 1 ). The graph in Figure 1 clearly shows that, as expected due to fixed costs and audit scale economies, the audit fee rate decreases as company size increases. (Hamilton et al., 2008) ); over the six year period the decline from 76% to 68% was statistically significant at the 1% level.
In other words, audit fee income for top tier auditors has risen while the number of auditees has fallen. This is consistent with the argument and evidence that the Big 5/4 auditors have shifted their client portfolio towards larger, less risky, clients (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 2006) . 20 CR6 and CR20 have been relatively stable over the six-year period across both measures.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Focusing on the concentration statistics based on the preferred audit fee proxy (panel B), the level of audit market concentration in the UK during the 6 year period has remained very high. In 1998 the top tier firms (then Big 5) audited 95% of the market and by 2003 this had grown to 96% (now Big 4). The increases in CR4 and CR6 over the period are statistically significant at the 1% level (2-tail). Looking back to 1991, 21 the top tier (then Big 6) had a markedly lower market share of 89% (Pong, 1999) .
The domination of the top tier firms clearly exceeds the economists' 60% tight oligopoly threshold (Shepherd, 1997) . The UK domestic listed audit market was a tight oligopoly by any market share proxy during the period of the present study (and back to 1991 at least). The lowest CR (Big5/4) was 68% in 2003 (number of audits) but was consistently above 94% based on audit fees. Such high concentration levels facilitate the possibility of successful collusion, overt or tacit, between the top firms.
In contrast to the k-firm concentration ratio, the more comprehensive HI and Gini coefficients for the whole market suggest a slight net decline in audit market concentration over the six year period. This contrasts with evidence from the US which finds concentration to have increased (Feldman, 2006) . These contrasting outcomes can perhaps be attributed to the substantially smaller market share of In the US, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission classify the HI into three regions with a value below 10 characterising an unconcentrated market, a value between 10 to 18 characterising a moderately concentrated market and a value above 18 characterising a highly concentrated market (GAO, 2003) . The present study reports an HI (based on number of audits) ranging between 12 and 14 (signalling moderate concentration). However, HI based on audit fees ranged between 25 and 28, signalling a highly concentrated audit market with potential for significant market power.
The Gini (whole market) coefficient remained very high throughout the entire period suggesting considerable inequality of market share across auditor participants.
However, while the Andersen demise had little impact on the overall picture, it has markedly reduced the level of inequality between the top tier firms. Looking back to 1991 and 1995, the Gini coefficients for top tier (then Big 6) market share based on audit fees were 29 and 30, respectively. 22 The final row in panel B reports the Gini (Big 5/4) coefficient for the study period. In 1998, the coefficient had risen to 48 (for the Big 5) but the impact of the redistribution of former Andersen clients reduced this to 30 (for the Big 4) by 2003. 23 Thus, the equality of audit market share for the four top tier firms has now returned to the level it was at prior to the Price Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand merger. This is explored further in the next section.
Individual firm market share at market level
Given the current interest in auditor choice and the viability of a challenge to the Big 4 by mid-tier firms (FRC, 2007b) , analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level (for the top tier and six leading mid tier firms). Several observations can be made from the detailed analysis of market shares by individual firm shown in Table 5 .
Based on audit fee ranking, PwC was the market leader with total market share of about 40%, a level that industrial organisation theorists cite as the cut-off level to identify the existence of a 'dominant firm' (Beattie et al., 2003) . It is interesting to note that the PwC market share was always markedly higher than that of the number two firm throughout the period. KPMG, the nearest rival, held only 23-26% of the market share. According to Shepherd (1997) , a dominant firm usually has two effects on prices similar to those of pure monopoly. First, they raise the level of their prices, often (though not always) gaining excess profits. Second, they engage in price discrimination.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Over 
Changes in Big 5/4 market dominance
To examine the underlying factors that have contributed to changes in concentration, a decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the 1998 to 2003 period is presented in Table 6 . The impact of four distinct consumer- or by acquisition. Second, they tended to gain larger companies as clients as a result of switches. This may reflect a Big 5/4 strategy of avoiding audits which they perceive to be high-risk, as evidenced in the US (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 2006) . Beattie et al. (2003) showed that in 2002 the Big 5 audited the entire FTSE 100 companies and almost 98% of the FTSE 250 companies. 24 Apart from auditor reputation, it has been argued that an auditor's technical capability in specific industry sectors is the main factor that causes large companies to choose a top tier auditor (Neal and Riley, 2004; Ferguson et al., 2006; Knechel et al., 2007) . This industryspecific technical capability can be achieved by specialisation, at both the national and city level (Ferguson et al., 2006; Basioudis and Francis, 2007) . 25 Table 7 
Industry concentration
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
There is no consensus on the level of market share that indicates industry specialism.
Prior studies have used various levels of market share including 10% and 20% (Craswell et al., 1995) , 30% (Knechel et al., 2007) and more recently 50% (Beattie et al., 2003) . Table 7 
26
Focussing on the relatively large sectors (by number of companies), 17 contain 30 or more companies (Craswell et al., 1995) . PwC was market leader in 10 of these large sectors. Just five sectors had a market leader auditor with at least 50% market share auditor. In the US, the switch to other Big 4 firms was more uniform than in the UK:
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Ernst & Young (26%); KPMG (25%); Deloitte (20%); and PwC (15%). Of 1,085
former Andersen US clients, the study reported that 717 (66%) companies switched to non-Deloitte Big 4 (compared to only 17% in the UK).
Andersen clients' global preference towards another Big 4 firm is not unexpected given the international reputation and capability of the Big 4. The figures in Table 8 give an indication of the redistribution of clients that might occur if there were to be a Similarly, there is no evidence of general fee discounting on initial audit engagement for former Andersen clients, in contrast with the evidence reported by Chi (2006) for the US. Ernst & Young gained the largest clients (based on total assets) and also achieved above-inflation audit fee increases of 11.7%, in aggregate. Not surprisingly, the non-Big 4 gains were typically smaller companies with smaller audit fees. The median decline in audit fee of -10.0% in respect of non-Big 4 successor auditors can be attributed to the loss of the Big 4 audit premium and/or more significant fee discounting on initial audit engagements by small auditors (as found in the US by Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006 and Kohlbeck et al., 2008) .
The overall 5.0% rise in audit fees for moves to Deloitte Touche, the acquirer of the Andersen UK business, is slightly above the rate of inflation. This is broadly consistent with the 'no change' result for clients who followed the Andersen audit team in the US (Kohlbeck et al., 2008) . However, in contrast with their results, the aggregate audit fee increase for moves to other Big 4 auditors of 1.6% (median change of 0.0%) provides no evidence of a fee premium in the UK, which does not support Hypothesis 4.
The audit fee rates (audit fees per £000 total assets) reported in Panel C seek to take client size changes over the year of change into account (albeit imperfectly). Medians are reported to reduce the impact of outliers, though the small sample size for non-Big 4 auditees and for individual Big 4 successors (except DT) still affects the stability of the median. However, the median percentage change in audit fee rate was 3.0%
(1.7%) for Big 4 (non-Big 4) and 2.4% overall; all are positive but again broadly in line with inflation, confirming that the audit fee results are not driven by changes in client size.
Overall, the lack of clear evidence of real (i.e. above inflation) audit fee rises for Andersen clients is perhaps surprising. These clients had a smaller pool of (large) audit firms from which to choose (especially when specialisation and refusal to appoint competitors' auditors are considered), which creates a demand pressure. The clients were also in a relatively weak bargaining position given their need to rebuild confidence. It suggests that either there was still sufficient competition to negate oligopolistic excesses, or the Big 4 did not seek to extract excess profits, politically aware that their actions would be closely monitored.
Panel D reports the level of NAS provided by Andersen and by the successor auditor.
It is interesting to consider whether the incentives to reduce NAS to counter a perceived lack of auditor independence are greater than the benefits of knowledge spillovers and/or of the cross-subsidisation of audit fees. Overall, it is clear that reported NAS fees (i.e. those provided by the auditor) fell significantly in aggregate following Andersen's demise: for Big 4 successors by -20%, for non-Big 4 by -47%
and overall by -20%; the median change in NAS was -13.2% overall and -17.1% for the major acquirer DT. Similarly, total fees (audit plus NAS) paid by auditees declined, by -12.2% overall (Panel E) with a median change of -3.9%. Thus, there is no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit fee by NAS (Hypothesis 5b). The evidence is consistent with the notion that audit firms and their clients responded to publicly-expressed concerns that NAS provision has the potential to affect external perceptions of auditor independence (Hypothesis 5a).
However, the detail shows that two audit firms (PwC and KPMG) did generate higher NAS fees than Andersen from the clients it took over. PwC generated an additional £0.7m NAS, also leading to an increase in total fees of £0.5m; the equivalent increases for KPMG were £0.5m (NAS) and £0.3m (total fees). The median changes in NAS for the individual four B4 auditors were: KPMG +8.4%; PwC 0.0%; DT -17.1%; and EY -52.6%. While this suggests that both KPMG and PwC may have gained, possibly from cross-subsidisation of audit fees by NAS income, this needs cautious interpretation given the very small sample sizes. Further, given the major market share of PwC (Pong and Burnett, 2006) , it is perhaps likely that PwC was already providing a higher level of consultancy services to Andersen-audited companies than other audit firms. Any consultancy provided by the successor auditor prior to its commencement as auditor would need to be reported in the financial statements as NAS, potentially with greater impact for PwC than other firms.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and audit fee rates in the UK domestic listed company market during a crucial period of structural market change (i.e., following the PricewaterhouseCoopers' merger and encompassing Andersen's demise, 1998 Andersen's demise, -2003 . Concentration is measured using two different size measures (number of audits and audit fees) and three measures of concentration (the k-firm concentration ratio, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index and the Gini coefficient), offering a detailed and consistent insight into trends over the six year period.
Analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level (for both the top tier and leading mid-tier firms) and by 34 industry sectors.
Concentration is shown to have been consistently high throughout the period, auditors by companies that have grown either organically or by acquisition. A secondary factor was that they tended to gain larger companies as clients as a result of switches. This may reflect investor and client preferences for a top tier auditor as they grow, or a Big 5/4 strategy of avoiding the smaller (and therefore higher-risk)
companies (Jones and Raghunandan, 1998; Rama and Read, 2006) . The rate of auditor change was reasonably high (5.8% p.a.) over the period, higher than reported in prior UK studies (4.1% p.a. in Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; 4.5% p.a. in Pong, 1999 ). This could be argued to indicate signs of increased competition brought about, in particular, by audit committees exercising their responsibilities in relation to auditor selection and appointment more actively during this period due to regulatory pronouncements in relation to corporate governance (e.g., Hampel Report, 1998; Smith Committee, 2003) . However, our evidence suggests that switching was not a major cause of change in concentration.
Extant evidence from Australia and the UK indicates that it is industry specialism, at both national and city level, and not just brand name that contributes to fee premia and auditor selection choices (Ferguson et al., 2003; McMeeking et al., 2006; Basioudis and Francis, 2007) . This study shows that mid tier firms could compete effectively in certain industries where they already have a significant presence. In eleven sectors, one or more mid-tier firms audited at least 2% audit fees, and in 9 sectors a mid-tier firm's market share exceeded that of one of the B4 firms. An however, the smallest companies that experienced a major (and statistically significant) increase of 155% (53%) in mean (median) audit fee rates, in contrast to an increase of 13% (19%) for the largest companies. Given the lack of evidence indicating anti-competitive behaviour by the top tier firms, despite high concentration levels, this finding supports the assertion that the Enron scandal lifted the intense pressure on audit fees and caused audit fees to increase substantially. There was a desire by companies and audit firms to instil confidence about audit quality in the financial market participants after this was damaged by Andersen's misconduct (the 'Andersen effect'). Thus, companies wanted more effort from their auditor, placing upward pressure on audit fees. Of course alternative interpretations are also consistent with the evidence -the audit fee rises may simply reflect changes in the general economic climate.
In relation to former Andersen clients, there was no significant above-inflation change in audit fees paid by them to their new auditors (the aggregate increase was 3.8%, with a median increase of 0%), The lack of evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing is consistent with Duxbury et al.'s (2007) modelling of the UK setting. It contrasts, however, with the evidence in Australia, where former Andersen clients paid higher audit fees (Hamilton et al., 2008) and in the US, where initial fee discounts were reported (Chi, 2006) . For nonBig 4 successor auditors in the UK, we find a median decline in audit fee of -10.0%.
This can be attributed to the loss of the Big 4 audit premium and/or more significant fee discounting on initial audit engagements by small auditors (as found in the US by Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006) . Moves to Big 4 auditors other than Deloitte Touche (who acquired most of the Andersen UK business) were not accompanied by an audit fee premium yet there was also no evidence of general fee discounting, both in contrast with the US (Chi, 2006) . Overall, the UK audit market response to Andersen's decline seems to have been relatively benign leading to a restrained 'business as usual' effect.
The lower level of observed NAS in the year of change to a new auditor following Andersen's demise provides little evidence of either knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of audit fees. Rather, it is consistent with a client (and audit firm) response to concerns over the potential impact of NAS on perceptions of auditor independence.
The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing in the UK listed company audit market. The key concern remains the lack of audit firm choice.
NOTES 1
On 31 May 2005, the US Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision to reverse this conviction. 17 This sample Gini coefficient needs to be multiplied by n/(n-1) to obtain unbiased estimators of population coefficients. 18 To avoid gross distortion caused by extreme values, the 1% trimmed mean is reported. 19 Concentration based on two more market share measures, auditee total assets and auditee sales, were also calculated. As the overall patterns of concentration are similar to those based on audit fees, they are not reported here in the interests of brevity. 20 The willingness of firms to drop risky clients is illustrated by Deloitte's resignation from Easier in 2004 (Accountancy Age, 2005a 21 Pong (1999) is the first study to report audit market concentration for the full UK market based on audit fees. Although Moizer and Turley (1987) used audit fees, their sample was limited to FTSE500 companies. 22 These were calculated using data taken from Pong (1999, Table 3, p. 461) . 23 The temporary rise in the Gini coefficient to 46 for 2002 reflects the fact that a relatively small number of clients continued to be audited by Andersen, giving the firm a small market share and leading to a wider inequality of market shares between the 5 top tier auditors. A broadly similar pattern of reduction in top tier inequality by 2003 is indicated in Panel A of Table 4 , where the Gini coefficient is based on number of audits. However, the smaller Gini coefficients (e.g. 15 for 2003) imply a much lower level of inequality between the Big 4; i.e. the number of companies that each firm audits is quite similar. BDO Stoy Hayward 4.60 (6) 5.27 (6) 5.34 (7) 6.24 (7) 6.08 (6) 5.84 (6) 1.06 (6) 1.28 (6) 1.47 (6) 1.50 (6) 1.35 (6) 1.02 (5) Grant Thornton 4.48 (7) 4.61 (7) 5.48 (6) 6.30 (6) 6.48 (5) 6.35 (5) 0.88 (7) 0.88 (7) 1.13 (7) 1.22 (7) 1.12 (7) 0.90 (6) Baker Tilly 1.00 (11) 1.13 (11) 1.69 (10) 1.56 (11) 3.61 (7) 4.18 (7) 
